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The Basics of ASICs: Protection for 
Semiconductor Mask Works in Japan and 
the United States 
INTRODUCTION 
During the 1970s and 1980s, industrial products changed 
worldwide as electric devices became electronic devices. Type-
writers metamorphosed from electric typebar models to electron-
ically-driven daisy-wheel printers.! Personal computers became 
more powerful, easier to use, and relatively inexpensive, making 
a mass home market feasible. 2 Automobile engines were designed 
to monitor themselves and to diagnose their own problems 
through repair-shop computers.3 
This combination of sophistication and cost-reduction was due 
largely to semiconductor technology. Before the advent of semi-
conductors such as transistors and integrated circuits, electrical 
functions required soldering wires to each element of a circuit. 
Sophisticated functions were impractical because they required 
large areas and cumbersome wiring.4 Semiconductors, however, 
allowed designers to put many functions on a tiny chip, thereby 
reducing size, complexity, and cost through lower material and 
assembly costS.5 
American manufacturers stood to make great profits from this 
new technology. They also realized that foreign competitors, es-
pecially from Japan, posed a threat to their market domination.6 
As a result, the U.S. semiconductor industry sought protection 
for their chips. The U.S. semiconductor producers claimed that 
I MICROELECTRONICS AND SOCIETY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: A REPORT TO THE CLUB 
OF ROME 5 (G. Friedrichs ed., 1982). 
2 Id. at 7, 72. 
3 Id. at 5. 
4 T. R. REID, THE CHIP: How Two AMERICANS INVENTED THE MICROCHIP AND 
LAUNCHED A REVOLUTION 14 (1984). 
5 Id. at 15. 
6 H. R. REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. _(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5750, 5752 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. See M. K. Fisher, Beyond Fair Use: Reverse Engi-
neering and the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,3 COMPUTER LAW 9, 9 (Apr. 1986). 
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foreign competitors would circumvent the high cost of developing 
their own chips by photographing the layout of U.S. vendors' 
chips.7 In this way, the foreign companies would be able to make 
identical but vastly less expensive chips, and capture the price-
sensitive U.S. market.8 To prevent losses of market share, the 
Semiconductor Industry Association petitioned Congress for leg-
islation to protect semiconductor devices.9 Specifically, it sought 
protection for the layouts that defined the circuits and functions 
contained on the chips. The result of this campaign was the 1984 
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (SCPA).l0 
At approximately the same time, Japan passed its Act Con-
cerning the Circuit Layout of a Semiconductor Integrated Circuit 
(Japanese Act).ll The Japanese Act closely follows the SCPA, and 
several commentators believe it was passed as a result of strong 
urging by the U.S. Government. 12 Like the SCPA, the Japanese 
Act created a new form of intellectual property to cover semicon-
ductors, distinct from patent or copyright. 13 
This Comment argues that both the SCPA and the Japanese 
Act are inappropriate for today's semiconductors. Although the 
acts do offer protection tailored to standard, off-the-shelf semi-
conductors, they do not cover today's most important products: 
application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs). Further, the 
SCPA leaves a large gap because it fails to cover joint develop-
ment, a common ASIC design practice. Part I of this Comment 
contains a brief overview of semiconductor technology, integrated 
circuits, and ASICs. Part II discusses the SCPA and the Japanese 
Act. Part III covers the actual results of both acts and explains 
why they provide inadequate protection for ASICs. Part III also 
offers suggestions for amendments to the two laws. The two acts 
7 HOUSE REpORT, supra note 6, at 5751. 
8 [d. at 5752; Fisher, supra note 6, at 9. 
9 Fisher, supra note 6, at 11-13. 
10 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § § 901-14 (West Supp. 1991). 
II Act Concerning the Circuit Layout of a Semiconductor Integrated Circuit, Law No. 
43 of 1985 [hereinafter Japanese Act]. 
12 Ronald S. Laurie, The First Year's Experience Under the Chip Protection Act or "Where are 
the Pirates Now That We Need Them?", 3 COMPUTER LAW 11, 16 (Feb. 1986). Another view 
suggests that Japan passed its semiconductor protection law because of the increasing 
threat of piracy from semiconductor manufacturers in developing countries in the Pacific 
Rim, such as Taiwan and Malaysia. Telephone Interview with T. Kato, Toshiba America 
Electronic Components, Inc., in Burlington, MA. (Apr. 2, 1991) [hereinafter Kato Inter-
view]. 
13 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5755. 
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should contain uniform protection and penalties in order to en-
courage development. Until the Japanese and U.S. governments 
take remedial action, however, customers and manufacturers who 
enter into development agreements should protect themselves by 
including clear ownership and licensing provisions in their con-
tractual arrangements. Finally, this Comment's conclusion sug-
gests that ASICs' growing importance, the problems of joint de-
velopment, and the differences in protection between the 
Japanese Act and the SCPA merit changing these laws. 
I. OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY 
A. Semiconductors 
AT&T Bell Laboratories introduced the first commercially vi-
able transistor in 1947.14 Since that time, semiconductor technol-
ogy has advanced substantially, although the underlying theories 
of electrical circuitry have remained the same. 15 An electrical 
circuit is an unbroken path over which electric current flows 
through several stages, or components. 16 Originally, these func-
tions were carried out by wiring that connected all the circuit 
elements. When engineers discovered silicon's unique ability to 
conduct electric current under some conditions and to resist it in 
others, they also found that the wiring's functions could be con-
trolled by the ability of semiconductors to "semi-conduct."17 In-
stead of a cumbersome collection of vacuum tubes and switches 
regulating the current, this new product, called a transistor, could 
contain paths for current flow directly on the silicon. 18 In addi-
tion, the transistor's entire package could be more densely packed 
with circuit elements, while at the same time avoiding the vacuum 
tube's dangerous heat-producing propensities. 19 
14 REID, supra note 4, at 16-20. 
15 /d. at IS. 
16 /d. at 17. A "passive component," such as a resistor or capacitor, takes the electrical 
current and stores it or slows down its passage through the circuit. An "active component" 
plays a more vital role: it acts as a "gate keeper," controlling when the current flows 
through its on/off action. It also can alter the signal once it has begun to flow through 
the circuit by amplifying or suppressing it. 
17 Id. at 15. 
IB Id. 
19 Id. at 14. Large numbers of vacuum tubes in early computing systems generated vast 
amounts of heat, often melting wiring and causing total failure. The great number of 
tubes that would be required to run today's sophisticated machines would render them 
impractical because of the large space they would require, as well as problems associated 
with cooling so many heat-generating devices. 
116 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XV, No.1 
Although transistors solved some size problems associated with 
complicated circuits, connecting each device still posed a problem. 
The only practical method involved hand-soldering, but if one 
small part of the solder was defective, the entire circuit would 
fail. 20 The solution to this problem came in 1958, with the de-
velopment of the integrated circuit (IC).2! 
B. Integrated Circuits 
Engineers developed the first IC as a phase shift oscillator, a 
small collection of circuit components on a single piece of silicon, 
connected by gold wire.22 Later versions of ICs used channels of 
metal filaments set into the silicon instead of wire connectors to 
connect the circuit elements.23 As the technology evolved, engi-
neers developed a photolithographic process to etch the metal 
connection onto the chip.24 
The simplicity of the first ICs gave way to more complex de-
signs.25 As circuit components and connections grew smaller, it 
became possible to integrate more elements in the same space. 
The level of integration controls the sophistication of the tasks 
the IC can perform. At lower levels, the IC can perform transis-
tor-like on/off functions. 26 At higher levels, the IC can perform 
logic functions relating to storage, processing, or manipulation 
of data.27 
20 [d. at 20. At the time, it was believed that the only precise way to make the connections 
was to have women hand-solder the wires, using magnifying glasses and tweezers, because 
their smaller hand size would enable them to do the delicate work. In addition to the 
questionable reasoning behind such a policy, this meant that the labor costs for assembly 
were still relatively high, and if one of the minuscule connections was defective, the entire 
circuit would fail. 
21 [d. at 65-67. 
22 [d. at 66. The phase shift oscillator was chosen because it incorporates all elements 
of an electronic circuit. 
23 [d. at 18-21,65. With the connections part of the silicon itself, reliability increased. 
There was an added benefit, because the areas previously taken up by external connections 
were now free to be used for additional components. 
2. Kato Interview, supra note 12. In this process, a laser etches the microscopic channels 
for connections away from the chip, after which layers of metal are applied. 
25 ALFRED W. BARBER, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO DIGITAL INTEGRATED CIRCUITS 25 (2d ed. 
1984). Engineers were eventually able to integrate thousands of components onto a single 
chip. As a result, the semiconductor industry has identified four main levels of integration: 
small-scale integration (SSI), medium-scale integration (MSI), large-scale integration (LSI), 
and very large-scale integration (VLSI). 
26 Kato Interview, supra note 12. 
27 [d. 
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C. ASICs 
ASICs use very large scale integration (VLSI)28 technology to 
achieve multiple functions on a single chip; because of the varied 
nature of ASIC functions, many elements must be on the chip.29 
Manufacturing an ASIC chip involves etching away successive 
layers of a thin wafer of silicon using photolithographic "masks" 
or patterns to control the topography of the chip.3o The number 
of masks used depends upon the complexity of the chip to be 
produced, with complex chips using up to twenty-four layers.3! 
ASIC design is always directed to a customer-defined perfor-
mance or function goal,32 and these customer-defined targets are 
the most important factors controlling an ASIC's complexity. 
The two main classes of ASICs, gate arrays and standard cells, 
differ mainly in their use of base layers and interconnections.33 
The design scheme chosen, however, affects the design's com-
plexity.34 In a gate array, all the base layers are predefined, so 
the designer must define only the interconnections between the 
elements, thereby enabling the chip to perform the desired func-
tion.35 Masks are customized in a standard cell, but their height 
is limited to control the transistor size and, thus, the chip's com-
plexity.36 These limits restrict the designer's choices, but they also 
result in a shorter time from design to production and lower costs 
than full custom chips.37 
Designing ASIC chips presents several issues which do not arise 
in designing standard chips. In a standard design, the goal is to 
design a chip that will become a part of a system made up of 
28 STEVEN S. LEUNG & MICHAEL A. SHANBLATT, ASIC SYSTEM DESIGN WITH VHDL: A 
PARADIGM 10 (1989). VLSI allows ASIC designs that contain up to 200,000 elements. 
29 [d. at xxi. ASICs comprise four general types of semi-custom chips: programmable 
logic devices (PLD), gate arrays (GA), standard cells (SC), and full custom (FC) designs. 
Generally, however, the term "ASIC" refers to gate array and standard cell designs; this 
Comment will be restricted to those meanings. [d. at 9-10. 
30 BARBER, supra note 25, at 22. 
31 Telephone Interview with Kenneth Pilczak, Area Sales Manager, ATMEL Corpora-
tion, in Braintree, MA. (Feb. 19, 1991) [hereinafter Pilczak Interview]; see also HOUSE 
REpORT, supra note 6, at 5762. 
32 Pilczak Interview, supra note 31. 
33 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
34 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
35 LEUNG & SHANBLATT, supra note 28, at 10. This is also sometimes called the "per-
sonalization layer." See also Laurie, supra note 12, at 18. 
36 LEUNG & SHANBLATT, supra note 28, at 10. 
3? [d. at 10-11. 
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many chips. ASIC design, on the other hand, endeavors to put 
an entire customer-specified system onto a single chip.38 Thus, in 
ASIC design, the designer must add or specify the connections 
between various elements of the chip itself. 39 As a result, these 
connections can take up to seventy percent of the chip area in 
some cases.40 Some ASIC designs also require self-testing, or 
"testability" functions to be built into the chipY Whereas stan-
dard chips can contain nodes for testing, and can be tested easily 
with other chips, an ASIC's complexity does not allow such ac-
cessibility, and requires that the chip be able to test its own per-
formance. 42 
D. joint Developments 
Most ASIC design projects involve joint developments between 
customers and vendors, which can cloud issues of ownership. In 
ASIC design situations, a customer typically will approach an 
ASIC vendor with specific design requirements.43 Two common 
approaches to ASIC development are full joint development, and 
partial joint development. In full joint work, the customer's en-
gineer will work with the vendor's design engineering staff to 
generate a schematic diagram of the chip layout using computer-
aided engineering (CAE) software and machinery.44 At this point, 
the computer scans and interprets the schematic diagram to make 
a "netlist," or alphanumeric representation of the circuit.45 This 
netlist can include interconnections and standard cells. Intercon-
38 Id. at 1; Kato Interview, supra note 12. 
39 Kato Interview, supra note 12. The analogy here is between transistors and integrated 
circuits. An integrated circuit can be defined simplistically as a series of transistors grouped 
to perform a certain function. Using the same example, an ASIC chip could be defined 
as a series of integrated circuits on a single chip, designed to perform a specific function. 
40 LEUNG & SHANBLATT, supra note 28, at 38. There are several different design 
techniques, however, that are reducing this figure. The "sea of gates" channelless type of 
gate array uses space more efficiently so there is less need for extra space for connections. 
The result in such designs is that there is more space for additional circuit elements. Kato 
Interview, supra note 12. 
41 LEUNG & SHANBLATT, supra note 28, at 38. Generally, "testability" is required when 
the chip is to function as part of a sophisticated system, such as a supercomputer. In such 
situations, this function is more critical because the system in which the chip is to be used 
is so complex. Kato Interview, supra note 12. 
42 Kato Interview, supra note 12. 
43 Piiczak Interview, supra note 31; see also LEUNG & SHANBLATT, supra note 28, at 40-
48. 
44 Piiczak Interview, supra note 31. 
45 Id. 
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nections are a customer's specifications for the circuit paths be-
tween elements of the chip. Standard cells are the vendor-speci-
fied layouts for logic and other elements of the chip.46 The netlist 
will also identify the chip, its inputs, outputs, and its use.47 
Partial joint work consists of the same steps, allocated differ-
ently. In this method, the customer defines its desired functions 
and reduces them to computer code. The customer then brings 
the resulting netlist to the manufacturer for the remaining 
steps.48 
After the CAE system processes the netlist, it generates a 
"sticks" layout, which is a first-level graphic representation of the 
circuit.49 The graphics blocks of the sticks layout are filled in with 
the correct parameters, and are then transferred to computer 
tape.50 Machines in the silicon foundry run these tapes and pro-
duce masks which will determine the layout and topography of 
the chips.5l 
E. Reverse Engineering 
Another aspect of the semiconductor design and production 
process is reverse engineering, which involves obtaining a copy 
of a competitor's chip and dissolving successive layers of silicon 
to discover the circuit pattern. 52 This is an important concept, 
largely because of the nature of the semiconductor industry. The 
industry relies heavily on second-source devices that are "form, 
fit, and function" replacements for the original devices because 
manufacturers may not be able to meet demands for a certain 
type of chip. 53 Few customers are willing to rely totally on one 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Kato Interview, supra note 12. 
49 Pilczak Interview, supra note 31. The layout is called a "sticks" layout because of its 
similarity to stick figure drawings. 
50 Id. 
5l Id. 
52 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5751. 
53 Id. at 5771. Another reason for the semiconductor industry's insistence on including 
reverse engineering provisions in the law involved the burgeoning personal computer 
(PC) market in the early 1980s. IBM, the developer of the popular DOS-based PC family, 
designed the machine in a way that allowed other companies to replicate the design very 
easily. This gave rise to a large market in "chip set" vendors, who specialized in selling 
copies of the IBM chips in the same configurations. The customers of these vendors 
became purveyors of the "clone" machines many PC users chose based on price. IBM 
later realized the revenue drain its open design caused, and fought back with its propri-
etary PS/2 series of personal computers. Kato Interview, supra note 12. 
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vendor for a device, and it is common for vendors to recommend 
second sources for their products.54 This practice of easy access 
to second sources is well established in the industry, due mainly 
to the fluctuations in silicon supply. 55 While at present many 
industry members concede that reverse engineering of an ASIC 
is very difficult, the technology does exist and is capable of being 
enhanced. 56 
With rapid advances in semiconductor technology, questions of 
design protection arise frequently. ASICs are poised to dominate 
semiconductor sales in the future, and issues of protection for 
them will become increasingly important. At present, however, 
traditional forms of intellectual property protection such as copy-
right and patent, as well as the SCPA, do not provide adequate 
protection for this valuable technology. 
II. MARKET FORCES AND THE RESULTING GOVERNMENTAL 
PROTECTION OF CIRCUIT LAYOUTS 
A. Market forces 
The wide range of uses for semiconductors in both new prod-
ucts and redesigned existing products created a huge market for 
this new type of electronic components. United States manufac-
turers feared a concerted effort by foreign semiconductor firms, 
especially the Japanese, to take over the U.S. market. Thus, U.S. 
manufacturers began to seek protection for their chips in 1979,51 
As a first step, industry members tried to obtain protection by 
fitting their chips into existing categories of intellectual prop-
erty.58 
54 Pilczak Interview, supra note 31. 
55 Another influential factor in the semiconductor industry's acceptance of easy second-
sourcing was the settlement of an AT&T antitrust suit in the early days of transistors. 
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 68,246 (D.N.]. Jan. 24, 
1956) cited in James Chesser, Note, Semiconductor Chip Protection: Changing Roles for Copyright 
and Competition, 71 VA. L. REV. 249, 264 (1985). As part of the settlement of a government 
antitrust claim against it, AT&T agreed to give others easy access to its transistor tech-
nology for very reasonable one-time licensing fees of $25,000. Bell Labs also ran training 
programs for other companies' personnel interested in producing transistors. This deci-
sion by AT&T, the inventor of the transistor, during the semiconductor's infancy, has 
influenced the industry to this day, both in the form of easy second-sourcing, and in 
cross-licensing agreements. 
56 Kato Interview, supra note 12. 
57 See supra note 9. 
58 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5752. 
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Several peculiarities in the semiconductor industry precluded 
an easy solution through then-existing patent or copyright law. 
Existing patent law was inadequate to protect semiconductor 
chips because of the Patent Act's subject matter coverage and the 
industry's dynamics. 59 The chips themselves and their layouts 
seldom reached high enough levels of novelty and non-obvious-
ness, two requirements for patent protection under the Act. 60 
The volatility of end-user markets for semiconductors also made 
patents inappropriate. Because technology changes rapidly, the 
typical two- to three-year waiting period made patent protection 
meaningless.61 By the time a semiconductor device was patented, 
the technology could have developed into a new, unprotected 
form. 
Legislative investigators then turned to the Copyright Act, be-
cause its subject matter coverage seemed expansive enough to 
cover chips.62 Among the subject matter covered by this statute 
were pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, which appeared to 
include drawings made of a chip's layout. Copyright law also 
offered a way around difficulties posed by changes in technology, 
because the Copyright Act explicitly addressed derivative works.63 
This avenue failed, however, because the Copyright Act as ap-
plied has distinguished between technical drawings and the ob-
jects produced using them. Although a technical drawing itself 
can be protected, the Copyright Act does not protect the objects 
made using the drawing.64 Thus the Act did not address the 
59 [d. 
60 Patent Act, 35 V.S.C.A. § § 102-03 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991); see also HOUSE 
REPORT, supra note 6, at 5752. 
61 Pilczak Interview, supra note 31. Semiconductor manufacturers estimate customer 
product lifespans to be from six months to three years. 
62 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). 
6' [d. The Copyright Act states in pertinent part that: 
[d. 
A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such 
as a translation, musical arrangement ... or any other form in which a work 
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an 
original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' 
64 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5757. See also Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 
F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972) (copying architectural plans to produce brochures is an 
infringement, but there is no prohibition against construction using details contained in 
the plans); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (unauthor-
ized copying of architectural plans is an infringement, but an injunction against further 
construction of a house using the plans was denied). 
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semiconductor manufacturer's main concern: prohibiting others 
from copying its circuit layout and selling the results. 
A second difficulty in using the Copyright Act to cover chips 
was the "useful article doctrine."65 Under this doctrine, the Copy-
right Act does not give protection to utilitarian objects unless 
their useful functions can be separated physically or conceptually 
from their aesthetic aspects.66 For example, a belt buckle that 
appears as a free-form metal sculpture is conceptually separable 
from its useful function. 67 A mask work, however, functions only 
as part of the manufacturing process and has no real aesthetic 
aspects, making it a purely useful article.68 The Copyright Office 
has consistently denied protection to useful articles, and has re-
fused to accept chips as copies of masks under the Copyright 
Act. 69 
After determining that existing intellectual property statutes 
could not appropriately be applied to mask works, Congress de-
cided that the correct answer to the problem lay in a new sui 
generis form of protection.70 Although the new act was modeled 
after the Copyright Act, it created a new form of industrial in-
tellectual property.71 
B. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (SCPA) of 1984 
Congress passed the SCPA in 1984 to protect semiconductor 
chips from piracy by competitors. Among the Act's purposes were 
to reward creativity; encourage innovation, research and invest-
ment in the semiconductor industry; prevent chip piracy; and to 
65 Mazer v. Stein, 347 V.S. 201, 218 (1954), the leading case in the "useful article" 
doctrine held that useful articles cannot be copyrighted unless they contain an indepen-
dent artistic element. In that case, a lamp base's design as a Balinese dancer was an artistic 
element deserving of copyright protection, separate from its use as a lamp base. 
66 See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(mannequin torso forms not protected as works of art because their form was inextricably 
bound to their function); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 
(2d Cir. 1980) (belt buckles protected as works of art as long as buckle can be conceptually 
separated from its function); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(shape of outdoor lighting fixture not protected because no aspect of a lighting fixture's 
shape is physically separable from its function). 
67 Kieselstein, 632 F.2d at 993. 
68 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5759. 
69 [d. at 5755. The Copyright Act requires that copyright holders place copies of each 
registered work in the Library of Congress. Copyright Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 401(a) (West 
1977 & Supp. 1991). 
70 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5754. 
71 [d. at 5755. 
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protect the public. 72 The SCPA defines a semiconductor chip 
product as having two or more layers of metallic semiconducting 
material etched away from a piece of semiconductor material in 
accordance with a predetermined pattern.73 The product must 
also be intended to perform electronic circuitry functions. 74 The 
mask work, or pattern for the chip layout, is a series of three-
dimensional patterns defining the layers of the chip.75 
A threshold requirement for SCPA protection is establishing 
ownership of the circuit layouts. The SCPA recognizes ownership 
of the layouts by the mask's creator, the legal representative of 
the creator, or the creator's employer if the work was created 
within the scope of employment.76 It is notable that the SCPA 
does not provide specifically for joint ownership and registration, 
even though joint developments in ASIC designs are common. 77 
The mask work owner may license some rights under the SCPA, 
but to transfer rights, he or she must transfer them all. 78 
To obtain protection under the SCPA, there are four require-
ments in addition to establishing ownership. First, the mask must 
72 [d. at 5750. It is unclear how the public at large was to benefit from this law; however, 
a threat was said to be "posed to the continued viability of the information society." [d. at 
5752. 
73 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 901(a)(I)(A) (West Supp. 1991). 
The semiconductor chip product [has) "two or more layers of metallic, insulating, or 
semiconductor material, deposited or otherwise placed on, or etched away or otherwise 
removed from, a piece of semiconductor material in accordance with a predetermined 
pattern." [d. 
74 [d. at § 901(a)(l)(A). 
75 [d. at § 901(a)(2)(A). The Act states in pertinent part that: 
[d. 
[A) 'mask work' is a series of related images, however fixed or encoded-(A) 
having represented the predetermined, three-dimensional pattern or metallic, 
insulating, or semiconductor material present or removed from the layers of a 
semiconductor chip product; and (B) in which series of the relation of images to 
one another is that each image has the pattern of the surface of one form of the 
semiconductor chip product. 
76 [d. at § 90 I (a)(6). The Act states in pertinent part that: 
[d. 
[T)he 'owner' of a mask work is the person who created the mask work, the 
legal representative of that person if that person is deceased or under a legal 
incapacity, or a party to whom all the rights under this chapter of such person 
or representatives are transferred in accordance with section 903(b); except that, 
in the case of a work made within the scope of a person's employment, the owner 
is the employer for whom the person created the mask work or a party to whom 
all the rights under this chapter of the employer are transferred in accordance 
with section 903(b). 
77 Compare Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 901(a)(6) (West Supp. 
1991) with Copyright Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 20 I (a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). 
78 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 903(b) (West Supp. 1991). 
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be fixed on a semiconductor chip.79 Second, the layout must be 
origina1.80 Third, its owner must meet citizenship or domicile 
requirements.81 Fourth, the owner must register the mask at the 
Copyright Office within two years. 82 
The first requirement for obtaining protection under the SCPA 
is that the mask be fixed on a chip.83 Once the mask is fixed on 
a chip, it must meet the second requirement, that it be original, 
or an original combination of existing designs.84 The SCPA does 
not define "original," rather, it takes its meaning from the Copy-
right Act, which equates originality with independent creation.85 
If the mask is original and fixed on a chip, protection is given 
based on the third requirement, the owner's domicile, as it relates 
to commercial exploitation of the chip.86 If a chip is first exploited 
outside the United States, it is protected if its creator is a national 
or domiciliary of the United States, or of a foreign nation that 
affords treaty-based mask protection to U.S. nationals. The chip 
is also protected if its creator is a stateless person.87 In the absence 
of a treaty, if the foreign nation offers protection for masks 
similar to protection under the SCPA, the President may issue a 
proclamation protecting that nation's masks in the United 
States.88 
The owner of the mask work must also register the work with 
the Register of Copyrights to obtain protection.89 If the owner of 
a mask does not register the mask within two years after it is first 
commercially exploited anywhere in the world, SCPA protection 
79 Id. at § 902(a)(1). 
80 Id. at § 902(b). 
81 Id. at § 902(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
82 Id. at § 908(a). 
83 Id. at § 902(a)(1). The SCPA holds that a mask is "fixed" on a chip when its pattern 
is contained in the chip in a permanent or stable form which can be perceived or 
reproduced from the other product for more than a short time. Id. at § 901(a)(3). 
84 Id. at § 902(b)(1)-(2). The masks will not be protected if they are "(1) not original; 
or (2) consist of designs that are staple, commonplace, or familiar in the semiconductor 
industry, or variations of such designs, combined in such a way that, considered as a 
whole, is not original." Id. 
85 Neil Boorstyn, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, COPYRIGHT LJ. 2 (1985). 
86 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 901(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1991). 
87 Id. at § 902(a)(1)(A). 
88 Id. at § 902(a)(2). The interim orders protecting Japanese masks in the U.S. expired 
on July 31, 1991. An extension of existing orders was issued under section 914 of the 
SCPA, 54 Fed. Reg. 50,793 (1989). Orders are also in place for Sweden, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, and France. 
89 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 904(a) (West Supp. 1991). 
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is lost.90 Once the mask work is registered, SCPA protection lasts 
for ten years from either the date of registration or the first 
exploitation, whichever comes first. 91 
Under the SCPA, the owner of the mask work has exclusive 
rights to reproduce it, and to import and distribute works that 
contain it.92 The mask owner may also authorize others to repro-
duce, import, and distribute the work.93 These exclusive rights, 
however, do not include the right to make derivative works based 
on the original, as the Copyright Act provides.94 
The SCPA limits the owner's rights by a "fair use" provision 
analogous to, but much broader than, the fair use concept in 
copyright. This concept allows public use of copyrighted material 
when the public interest so warrants.95 The SCPA allows tradi-
tional fair uses such as analysis and research intended to expand 
knowledge and encourage research. Recognizing the common 
practices in the semiconductor industry, however, the SCPA also 
allows reverse engineering.96 
The reverse engineering provisions of the SCPA prohibit only 
the complete stripping down of a chip to determine its makeup 
90 [d. at § 908(a). The Copyright Act, however, makes registration permissive rather 
than mandatory. Copyright Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 408 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). 
91 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 904(b) (West Supp. 1991). 
92 [d. at § 905. The Act states in pertinent part that: 
[d. 
The owner of a mask work provided protection under this chapter has exclu-
sive rights to do and authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the mask 
work by optical, electronic, or any other means; (2) to import or distribute a 
semiconductor chip product in which the mask work is embodied; and (3) to 
induce or knowingly cause another person to do any of the acts described in 
paragraphs (1) and (2). 
95 [d. 
94 Copyright Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 106(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). The Copyright Act 
gives a copyright holder the exclusive right to prepare derivative works. 
95 Compare Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 906 (West Supp. 1991) 
with Copyright Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). The Copyright Act 
allows for fair use which includes purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching, scholarship, or research. 
96 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 906 (West Supp. 1991). The Act 
states in pertinent part that: 
[d. 
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 905, it is not an infringement of 
the exclusive rights of the owner of a mask work for-(l) a person to reproduce 
the mask work solely for the purpose of teaching, analyzing, or evaluating the 
concepts or techniques embodied in the mask work or the circuitry, logic How, 
or organization of components used in the mask work; or (2) a person who 
performs the analysis or evaluation described in paragraph (1) to incorporate 
the results of such conduct in an original mask work which is made to be 
distributed. 
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for the purpose of replicating the findings in an identical chip.97 
Thus, the SCP A allows a chip designer to analyze a chip and 
incorporate the results of the analysis into a new mask work. The 
second designer is then free to copy, import, or distribute this 
new device, receiving essentially the same rights for the copy as 
the creator received for the original mask.98 The SCPA allows 
this "quasi-copying" through reverse engineering because of the 
tight market in semiconductors.99 
Mask owners who have registered a work, may enforce their 
exclusive rights under the SCPA. Under the terms of the act, 
owners are entitled to bring a civil action for infringement in any 
U.S. district court within three years after the claim accrues.lOO 
Upon a finding of infringement, owners may receive actual dam-
ages, or total statutory damages of $250,000 for each instance of 
infringement in a cause of action. lOl The court may also order 
the destruction of any infringing products or the masks with 
which they were produced. l02 
C. The Japanese Act Concerning the Circuit Layout of a 
Semiconductor Integrated Circuit 
Due in large part to pressure from the U.S. government and 
fear of losing protection for its nationals' mask works, the Japa-
nese government enacted the Japanese Act in 1985. 103 The Jap-
anese Act was directed at the reciprocity provision of the SCPA, 
which gives foreign mask works protection if their governments 
offer protection similar to the SCPA to U.S. nationals. 104 The 
Japanese Act is largely modeled after the SCP A, although there 
are some significant differences in penalty and procedure. 
97 Id. at § 906. See also Fisher, supra note 6, at 9. 
98 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 906(a)(2) (West Supp. 1991). 
99 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
100 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 910(b)(l), § 911(a), (d) (West 
Supp. 1991). The SCPA does not, however, provide for criminal sanctions against infrin-
gers. 
101 Id. at § 911(c). 
102 Id. at § 911 (c)(2). 
10' Japanese Act, supra note 11; see also Laurie, supra note 12, at 16; 12 INT'L EXECUTIVE 
REP., Feb. 15, 1990, available in LEXIS, Country Reports Library, Asia File. There are, 
however, other schools of thought which hold that a more compelling reason for enact-
ment of the Japanese Act was japan's fear of large scale infringement from companies 
based in the newly-expanding PaciJ1c Rim countries. See supra note 12 and accompanying 
text. 
104 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 902 (West Supp. 1991). 
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The Japanese Act is intended to promote the development of 
semiconductor integrated circuits and, thus, contribute to a 
healthy economy.105 The Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) oversees the registration of masks. 106 MITI is 
the governmental body charged with taking a special interest in 
nurturing key industries, such as the semiconductor industry.107 
Under the Japanese Act, a semiconductor integrated circuit is 
a product which has transistors or other circuitry elements inse-
parably formed on a semiconducting material and which is de-
signed to perform an electronic circuitry function. lOB The mask's 
creator or the creator's successor may register it,109 but if the 
layout is created during the course of employment, the employer 
owns the mask. 110 The Japanese Act also provides for joint 
ownership of the mask work by two or more creators. 1l1 If the 
owner of the mask has transferred, leased, or imported semi-
conductor products using the mask within two or more years 
prior to applying for registration, the application will be de-
nied.1l2 MITI may also deny an application if the applicant is 
not the creator, the work was jointly created but not all parties 
have sought registration, or the cabinet has prohibited such 
registration by special order.113 MITI may also cancel an exist-
105 Japanese Act, supra note 11, at art. 1. The Act specifically says that "the purpose of 
this Act is to promote the development of semiconductor integrated circuits by establishing 
a system for ensuring the adequate use of the circuit layout of a semiconductor integrated 
circuit, and thereby contribute to the healthy development of the national economy." Id. 
106 Id. at art. 8(1). 
107 EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, JAPAN: THE STORY OF A NATION 274 (3d ed. 1986). See also 
REID, supra note 4, at 172-73; KAREL VANWOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER: 
PEOPLE AND POLITICS IN A STATELESS NATION 124-25 (1989). Although the Japanese 
government maintains that the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is 
merely an advisory agency, many Westerners still believe that the Ministry targets certain 
industries for strategic infusions of government money and assistance. 
108 Japanese Act, supra note 11, at art. 2(1). 
109 Id. at art. 3(1). 
110 Id. 
III [d. 
112 Id. at art. 6. 
113 Id. at art. 8. The Japanese Act states in pertinent part that: 
The Minister of International Trade and Industry shall dismiss an application 
for registration for establishment if it is evident from the application form ... 
that the application for registration for establishment falls within any of the 
following items: (1) where the applicant is not the creator, etc.; (2) where there 
are two or more creators, etc., and they have not jointly applied for registration 
for establishment; (3) where the applied-for circuit layout is not eligible for 
registration for establishment under the provisions of Article 6; or (4) where the 
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ing registration based on a later finding of any of the previous 
factors. 114 
Unlike the SCPA, the Japanese Act covers anyone who registers 
a mask, regardless of where the work was first exploited or the 
nationality of its creator. 1I5 Additionally, the Japanese Act does 
not provide for continuous government control over the regis-
tration process. When the Japanese Act was first passed, MITI 
handled the initial steps. MITI was, however, empowered by the 
Japanese Act to designate an outside authority to handle the 
process. MITI assigned this process to a private body, the Indus-
trial Property Cooperation Center (IPCC),116 after which MITI 
became an overseer in the system. 117 
Rights under the Japanese Act vest in the mask owner upon 
registration and continue for ten years from that date.ll8 The 
registrant obtains exclusive rights to use the layout for business 
purposes, but has no rights against others using the same layout 
if created independently by someone else.1I9 The Japanese Act 
also contains reverse engineering provisions similar to those in 
the SCPA. As a result, a holder of a circuit layout right cannot 
prevent the manufacture of another chip produced by using and 
analyzing the registered mask. 120 
Rights under the Japanese Act may be transferred either as 
sole use rights or ordinary use rights. 121 Sole use rights operate 
similarly to U.S transferral of rights; ordinary use rights are 
similar to licenses. In each case, any grantee of a right may 
transfer that right only if it is transferred along with the business 
that uses the circuit layout, if the circuit layout owner has ap-
Id. 
application form does not comply with the formal requirements, or there are 
other grounds provided for by Cabinet order. 
114 Id. at art. 9(1). 
115 Id. at art. 47. 
116 Under the Japanese Act, however, MITI may examine the Industrial Property 
Cooperation Center's (IPCC) performance and terminate its management of the registra-
tion process. Japanese Act, supra note 11, at art. 41. MITI Ordinance No. 81, Dec. 24, 
1985, cited in 53 Fed. Reg. 16,308 (1988). There is some concern about the role of the 
IPCC in Japan's mask registration system because many U.S. semiconductor manufactur-
ers believe that the body is closely tied to that nation's domestic semiconductor industry. 
See 12 INT'L EXECUTIVE REP. Feb. 15, 1990, available in LEXIS, Country Reports Library, 
Asia File; 12 INT'L EXECUTIVE REP. Jan. 15, 1990, available in LEXIS, Country Reports 
Library, Asia File. 
117 Japanese Act, supra note 11, at art. 28(1). 
118 Id. at art. 10. 
119 Id. at art. 11. 
120 Id. at art. 12(2). 
121 Id. at arts. 16 (sole use rights), 17 (ordinary use rights). 
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proved the transfer, or if inheritance or other general succession 
has taken place. 122 
Infringement under the Japanese Act is defined as use of the 
circuit for business purposes, primarily for imitation of the 
mask. 123 The holder of the registration may demand that a 
wrongdoer cease the activity, and may also demand that one likely 
to infringe take steps to avoid it. 124 The mask owner may further 
demand that any infringing products be destroyed and that other 
steps be taken to avoid future infringement. 125 If the violation is 
detected after the fact, the wrongdoer will be liable for royalties 
to the creator equal to the normal rate for such use. 126 The creator 
must, however, register the mask before demanding compensa-
tion for the alleged infringement. 127 
Penalties for infringement under the Japanese Act are limited 
to prison terms or fines. Upon complaint to the authorities, any-
one who infringes on a circuit layout right shall be punished with 
penal servitude not exceeding three years or a fine not exceeding 
one million yen. 128 Similarly, anyone who registers a layout by 
fraud may be punished with a prison term of up to one year, or 
a fine of up to 300,000 yen. 129 Anyone in the registration office 
who reveals secrets disclosed in the registration process may also 
be punished with a prison term of up to one year or a fine of up 
to 300,000 yen. 130 Finally, if an agent of an individual or a jur-
idical person, such as a corporation, infringes on a layout or 
obtains a registration by fraud, then the principal shall be liable 
for the fine in each case, while the violator will receive either the 
fine or the prison term. 131 
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE ACTS, AND THE PROBLEM OF ASICs 
A. The SCPA and the Japanese Acts in Practice 
After passage of the SCPA in the United States, there was a 
flurry of mask registrations, but subsequently there has been a 
122 [d. at arts. 16(3), 17(3). 
123 [d. at art. 23. 
124 [d. at art. 22( 1). 
125 [d. at art. 22(2). 
126 [d. at art. 25(2). 
127 [d. at art. 27(2). 
128 [d. at art. 51. At the current rate of exchange (129.95 yen = $1.00), this is approx-
imately $7,695.00. WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1991, at 1. 
129 Japanese Act, supra note II, at art. 52. 
"0 [d. at art. 54. 
131 [d. at art. 56. 
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slowdown in applications. 132 There are two theories for this slow-
down. The first proposes that the SCPA has fulfilled its objective 
of showing clearly that the masks are protected, which has in 
turn stopped pirating. The second, more widely held view, is that 
registrations are down because the SCPA is an ineffective piece 
of legislation that does not address the advances in semiconductor 
technology which have occurred since 1984.133 Evidence points 
in favor of the latter view because of the difficulties in copying a 
highly-integrated circuit. 134 The copyist must not only replicate 
the topography of the chip, but must also ensure that the silicon 
used in the copies is identical to the origina1. 135 
The lack of litigation under both the SCPA and the Japanese 
Act also points to their irrelevance. To date, no cases have been 
brought under the Japanese Act, and only one has been brought 
under the SCPA: the Brooktree case. 136 The Brooktree case pre-
sented an opportunity to clear up some of the ambiguities of 
terms in the SCPA, because, as sui generis legislation, there was 
no controlling precedent. Brooktree, however, dealt only with stan-
dard, off-the-shelf products and offered little general guidance 
with regard to the SCPA and ASICs. It did, however, offer some 
clues to judicial standards for applying the reverse engineering 
provisions of the SCP A. 
In the case, Brooktree sought a judgment against Advance 
Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD) for copying its video chip layouts. 137 
1>2 Curiously, half the registrations at the end of 1985, the first year registrations were 
available, went to foreign mask work owners. Laurie, supra note 12, at 11. Yearly tallies 
of registrations have been 1263 (1985), 859 (1986), 1122 (1987), and 1047 (1988). Robert 
J. Risberg, Jr., Comment, Five Years Without Infringement Litigation Under the Semiconductor 
Chip Protection Act: Unmasking the Spectre of Chip Piracy in an Era of Diverse and Incompatible 
Process Technologies, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 241, 265 n.120. More recent tallies have been: 
1162 (1989) and 1093 (1990). Letter from Melissa Dadant, Supervisor, Mask Work Unit, 
Copyright Office (Apr. 18, 1991) [hereinafter Dadant letter]. Interestingly, registrations 
by Japanese parties have exceeded those of U.S. parties: 585 versus 530 (1989), and 759 
versus 309 (1990). 
133 Risberg, Comment, supra note 132, at 276. 
1>. Kato Interview, supra note 12. 
1>5 Risberg, Comment, supra note 132, at 256; Pilczak Interview, supra note 31. 
136 Brooktree v. AMD, 705 F. Supp. 491, 491 (S.D. Cal. 1988), memorandum decision, 
No. CIV 88-1750-E (CM), 1990 WL 23618 at * 1, 1990 WL 23619 at * 1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 
II, 1990). 
137 Id. Brooktree Corporation is a semiconductor manufacturer engaged in designing, 
producing, and selling semiconductor chips for high-resolution computer graphics dis-
plays. Brooktree, 705 F. Supp. at 493. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD) is one of the 
largest U.S. chip manufacturers, which competes with Brooktree. Id. In its suit, Brooktree 
alleged that AMD had pirated Brooktree's Bt451 and Bt458 IC chips by direct copying, 
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AMD raised the reverse engineering defense, claiming that even 
if it took parts of Brooktree's layouts, it added its own work, 
resulting in a new product. 138 Although the reverse engineering 
defense was thought "fail-safe" if a defendant proved additional 
work through a "paper trail," examination of the Brooktree result 
demonstrates that proving reverse engineering alone is not 
enough to avoid infringement penalties under the SCPA.139 
In ruling on a motion for a temporary restraining order against 
AMD, the judge set out the standards for reverse engineering. 140 
He noted that if a chip is reverse engineered, there is an infringe-
ment only if the new chip is substantially identical to the original 
chip.141 In addition, if a defendant accused of infringing on an 
SCPA-registered chip can produce a detailed "paper trail" show-
ing both analysis of the original chip, as well as significant inde-
pendent work, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the iden-
tical nature of the chips.142 In denying Brooktree's motion, the 
judge noted that the purpose of the SCPA was to prevent whole-
sale copying. 143 Implicit in his ruling was approval of the sort of 
research and development work accomplished by AMD's work. 144 
which then allowed it to introduce the AMD replicas at a significantly lower cost. Id. 
Specifically, Brooktree alleged that AMD had copied active areas in some cells of the Bt 
chips and also had copied the location and paths of connectors between the cells. Id. at 
494. 
138 Brooktree, 705 F. Supp. at 495. In its defense to the SCPA infringement charges, 





143 Id. The judge also noted that Brooktree had proved neither the likelihood of success 
on the merits, nor irreparable harm. Id. at 496. 
144 The jury in Brooktree returned a verdict in favor of Brooktree, with damages in the 
amount of $25 million. Brooktree v. AMD, 1990 WL 23618, at * . Despite AMD's having 
raised the reverse engineering defense, thought to be fail-safe if accompanied by a paper 
trail, the jury rejected the claim. An important element in the decision was that although 
AMD used a small portion of the Brooktree layouts, the portions it took were critical 
operating parts. The jury found that AMD used only about 30 percent of Brooktree's 
layouts, but the parts it took were 80 percent of the transistors, the critical operating parts 
of the circuits. Brooktree, 705 F. Supp. at 495. 
In a memorandum decision after the verdict, the judge in the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of California stated that a plaintiff need not prove that every layer, 
circuit, and cell of the defendant's work are the same as the original, but only that the 
defendant misappropriated a material portion of the chip. Brooktree, 1990 WL 23618, at 
* 4. The court upheld the jury's award of $25 million to Brooktree, and issued a per-
manent injunction prohibiting AMD from making, using, or selling any chips containing 
the mask work layout found to infringe Brooktree's mask work rights. Brooktree, 1990 WL 
23619, at * 1, * 5. 
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Once the case was presented to the jury, however, the panel did 
not accept the reverse engineering defense. One reason for this 
verdict favoring Brooktree was that although AMD was able to 
show a paper trail, the portions of its design identical to the 
Brooktree design were also the most critical elements of the 
Brooktree chips.145 
B. The Problem of ASICs 
Even with the Brooktree decision, there is still very little guidance 
for future litigants under the SCPA. The case offers little judicial 
analysis of a reverse engineering claim, and is limited to its facts. 
Significantly, the Brooktree case fails to comment on ASICs or 
custom chips, which are predicted to dominate integrated circuit 
sales in the future. 146 Under the current legislation in both Japan 
and the United States, predictable ASIC protection is difficult 
because of the acts' limited subject matter coverage, incomplete 
treatment of ownership issues, and differing penalty provisions. 
ASICs defy categorization under either the Japanese Act or 
the SCPA. Neither act addresses custom chips or their elements, 
such as connectors or cells. 147 This omission in itself would not 
cause a problem if the elements of ASICs, standard cells and 
connectors,148 fit squarely within the definitions contained in ei-
ther act. The Japanese Act seems to cover collections of uncon-
nected circuit elements like gate arrays.149 The SCPA's require-
ment, however, that a mask be fixed on a chip intended to 
perform electronic circuitry functions causes some difficulty.15o 
In its pure form, a gate array can be fixed onto a semiconductor 
chip without any connections between the various circuit ele-
145 Brooktree, 705 F. Supp. at 495. 
146 Samuel Weber, The Chip Business Has a Worried Look, ELECTRONICS 70 (jan. 1991). 
The semiconductor industry is estimated at sales of $50 billion worldwide. Despite declines 
in sales for semiconductors last year, the industry expects ASIC revenues to increase by 
11 percent in 1991, largely due to gate array and standard cell designs. Because many 
electronic functions are still carried out by using discrete components on printed circuit 
boards, many in the industry feel that there is substantial room for growth in ASICs as 
these circuit board designs are miniaturized using ASICs. 
147 Compare Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 107 (West Supp. 1991) 
with Japanese Act, supra note II, at art. 4. 
148 See supra notes 26-49 and accompanying text. 
149 Japanese Act, supra note 11, at art. 2(2). 
150 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 902(a)( 1) (West Supp. 1991). See 
also Laurie, supra note 12, at 18. 
1992) ASICs 133 
ments. 15I Thus, the gate array on a chip is incapable of perform-
ing electronic circuitry functions, because no complete paths exist. 
It could be possible to register each individual element of the 
gate array, but the sheer volume of such elements would make 
individual registrations time-consuming and prohibitively expen-
sive. 152 In addition, the Copyright Office's regulation requiring a 
mask to be fixed on a chip in its most complete form would seem 
to preclude gate arrays by definition, because they are incomplete 
before the customer adds the connections. 153 
1. Cell Libraries 
The more difficult problem of subject matter coverage for 
ASICs is the cell library. A cell library is a vendor's collection of 
standard circuit elements which a customer/designer can combine 
to create a desired circuit. 154 Typically, cell libraries are stored on 
magnetic tape or computer memory, and because they are not 
fixed on a semiconductor chip, they are ineligible for SCPA pro-
tection. 155 The Japanese Act, on the other hand, does not specif-
ically require fixation in order to obtain protection, although 
definitions in article 2 suggest that the layout be on a chip before 
registration. 156 As a key element of ASIC design which the man-
ufacturer wants to use repeatedly, the cell library should be pro-
tected. 157 
151 Laurie, supra note 12, at 18. 
152 [d. 
153 [d. Because of the confusion over whether even a gate array with connectors could 
be registered, the Copyright Office stated that both personalized (connected) and unper-
sonalized (unconnected) gate arrays can now be registered. 255 PRACTISING L. INST.lPAT. 
247. In 56 Fed. Reg. 7,816 (No. 38, 1991), the Copyright Office formalized this position, 
permitting separate registrations of unpersonalized gate arrays and the customized me-
tallization [connection) layers. The problem, however, of the cost of registering each 
individual array remains. 
15. See supra notes 28-51 and accompanying text. 
155 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U .S.C.A. § 902(a)( 1) (West Supp. 1991). 
The Copyright Office has also held that the masks be fixed on silicon or other semicon-
ducting material in order to be protected under the SCPA, and that fixation on computer 
tape is not sufficient for the purposes of the Act. PRACTISING L. INST.lPAT., supra note 
153, at 358. 
156 Japanese Act, supra note 11, at art. 2. 
157 Kato Interview, supra note 12. The cell library itself has value to the manufacturer 
as a selling point of its technology. Many semiconductor producers actively market the 
completeness of their cell libraries as inducements to customers. It is also becoming 
common for major vendors to cooperate in sharing their libraries with others in order to 
offer the customer security in second sourcing. In such agreements, however, the vendors 
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Commentators have suggested that masks for ASICs, especially 
cell libraries, are analogous to computer programs,158 which re-
ceive copyright protection. 159 This analogy fails primarily because 
of the nature of a computer program itself. In the case of an 
operating system program stored on a chip, the chip is merely 
the medium on which a protected form of creation is stored, 
similar to writing on paper. The important distinction here is that 
a computer program can be divorced from the medium on which 
it is stored. It is possible, through sophisticated programming 
techniques, to have the operating system generate a hard copy 
printout of itself. 160 In the case of masks for ASICs, the mask 
and chip are inseparable. The mask is more correctly regarded 
as a step in the process of creating a chip, rather than an end in 
itself. 161 In either case, it is ineligible for copyright protection, 
because copyright does not extend to useful articles or pro-
cesses. 162 
Further complications arise when the ownership provisions in 
the acts combine with common practices in ASIC design projects. 
There are two main problems of ownership, depending on 
whether one considers the ASIC a work-for-hire, or a jointly-
owned product. A typical situation involves a customer-designed 
chip based on elements from the vendor's cell library, connected 
by paths the customer specifies. 163 Under the SCPA, the cell 
library is not protected until it is fixed on a chip,164 but fixation 
does not occur until the customer has designed the connections. 165 
At that time, under both acts, the creator, or the employer in the 
carefully include restrictions on disclosure and use so that their proprietary information 
remains controllable. 
158 See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Note, Copyright Protection for ASIC Gate ConfifSU-
rations: PLDs, Custom and Semicustom, 42 STAN. L. REV. 163 (1989). 
159 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F. 2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 
1983). In Apple Computer, the court held that fixing a computer program onto a ROM 
chip satisfied the requirements of the Copyright Act for protection, and denied the 
defendant's argument that the ROM chip itself was a useful article not eligible for 
protection. 
160 Kato Interview, supra note 12. It is also conceivable that one could perform the 
same operation to determine the microcode instructions on an ASIC chip. This operation, 
however, is very difficult and time-consuming. 
161 Laurie, supra note 12, at 18. 
162 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
163 See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text. 
164 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U .S.C.A. § 901 (a)( 1) (West Supp. 1991). 
165 See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text. 
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case of works created during employment, owns the layout. 166 
This reading would suggest that in cases where standard cells are 
used, the original vendor cannot protect the cell, but a customer 
can protect a design which incorporates the cells. The real dam-
age, however, would occur downstream, because that layout 
would later be susceptible to reverse engineering. Given that the 
courts have not indicated clearly how they will interpret the re-
verse engineering rules in the future, a vendor could ultimately 
lose a very valuable asset: the cells in its library. A vendor who 
faces the prospect of losing cell libraries may severely restrict 
access and, effectively, discourage future technological develop-
ments. Given that both acts profess interest in promoting devel-
opment, this result is clearly harmful. 
2. Joint Ownership 
The question of joint ownership poses an even greater problem 
in an industry where most advances result from close vendor and 
customer cooperation. The Japanese Act clearly allows joint own-
ership of a mask,167 but the SCPA remains silent. 168 It is reason-
able to conclude, however, that Congress chose not to include 
such a provision because the SCP A was modeled after the Copy-
right Act, which explicitly allows joint ownership.169 Difficulty 
arises when a customer insists upon owning all the masks, while 
the vendor wishes to retain rights in the base layer and cell 
libraries. 
The lines in ASIC design blur between creator and producer. 
In some projects, the customer specifies all the logic functions, 
but the manufacturer actually executes them.l7° This situation 
would seem to give both sides claim to the title of "creator." In 
166 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 901(a)(6) (West Supp. 1991); 
Japanese Act, supra note II, at art. 5. 
167 Japanese Act, supra note II, at art. 3. 
168 Recently, however, the Copyright Office has stated that it "could easily conceive of 
joint ownership resulting either from joint creation or from an assignment or contractual 
division of rights. There would be no impediment to registering a claim to mask work 
protection in the names of two or more joint owners." Dadant letter, supra note 132. The 
difficulty with this proposition, however, is that it is not well known, and is only the 
Copyright Office's interpretation of existing, unclear statutory language. Given that the 
SCPA is modeled after the Copyright Act, it suggests that if Congress intended to allow 
for joint registrations, it would have done so explicitly, as in the Copyright Act. 
169 Copyright Act, 17 V.S.C.A. § 201(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). 
170 See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text. 
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other projects, the customer merely specifies the interconnections 
between circuit elements, and the vendor designs and produces 
them. l7l In such a case, the vendor appears to have a strong claim 
as a creator of the entire circuit. Absent joint ownership provi-
sions in the SCPA, the vendor and customer must painstakingly 
negotiate each point, consuming large amounts of time and 
money.172 Consequently, the development is stalled. This result 
contravenes the purpose of promoting semiconductor develop-
ment stated in both the SCPA and the Japanese Act. 
The most obvious concerns of a vendor are that it retain rights 
to its cell libraries and mask rights in the base layers. The cus-
tomer should receive mask rights in the netlists and connections 
it adds to the design. Because a great deal of copying is done in 
order to serve as a second source to an original vendor's device, 
provisions should be made for the vendor to allow such activity, 
while retaining maximum control over its cell libraries and other 
proprietary data. A possible solution would be for the vendor to 
grant a license to the customer, allowing it to procure devices 
using the vendor's cells in the event that the vendor is unable to 
fulfill its supply or price obligations. In this way, the vendor 
protects its proprietary rights, and the customer would be able 
to obtain exact copies of the chips under a license, should the 
primary source fail. 
3. Penalty Provisions 
The final problem with the Japanese Act and the SCPA are 
their markedly different penalty provisions. 173 For the same act 
of infringement, a defendant could face either a prison sentence 
in Japan, or a civil lawsuit in the United States. Given that much 
ASIC development is done by U.S. and Japanese companies op-
erating in both countries, such unequal treatment could cause 
hesitation on the part of developers. The penalty provisions 
should be coordinated in the acts, either by making them iden-
tical, or by inserting a clause into each act guaranteeing that an 
infringer will face the penalties of his own nation. 
171 [d. 
172 Kato Interview, supra note 12. Negotiations over the specifics of ownership can add 
additional months to a development plan. [d. 
173 Compare supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text with supra notes 100-02 and 
accompanying text. 
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The strong growth projected for ASICs in the future suggests 
that immediate action is necessary to prevent future problems. 174 
Countries such as Japan and the United States, whose high tech-
nology companies will take the lead in the industry, should be 
especially interested in amending their chip protection acts to 
cover ASICs. Any amendment should include clear definitions of 
ownership in vendor-client design situations. It should also in-
clude provisions for such things as standard cells and gate arrays. 
Further, in order to make the world marketplace more predict-
able, the penalty provisions of both acts should be coordinated. 
Given that U.S. sources predict Japan as a fertile market for U.S.-
produced ASICs,175 the danger of imprisonment for the infringer 
in Japan, but not in the United States, should be addressed. 
If the countries' legislative bodies do not see fit to make such 
changes in their laws, parties to ASIC developments may still take 
steps to safeguard themselves. The complexity of an ASIC design 
is usually such that third-party usurpation of the masks is unlikely 
without other tortious behavior.176 However, when the issue is 
one of ownership between customer and vendor, the parties 
should look to contractual remedies. Contract law should prove 
flexible enough to cover the parties' current and anticipated 
needs. 177 
C. Proposed Amendments to the SCPA and the japanese Act 
The semiconductor industry is an important one for both Japan 
and the United States, and technology advances should be pro-
tected in both nations. The two acts as they stand, however, 
should be modified to protect ASICs as well as standard parts. 
Given that much ASIC work is done between Japanese and U.S. 
firms, coverage under these acts should be coordinated to offer 
standard protection to firms operating in both countries. Specif-
ically, changes should be made in the following areas: subject 
matter coverage, ownership, and penalties for infringement. 
174 Risberg, supra note 132, at 256. 
175 NAT'L TRADE DATA BANK MKT. REP. 1,7 (Aug. 1989). 
176 Kato Interview, supra note 12. Under tight security systems, it would be difficult for 
a third party to obtain a design unless it resorts to fraud or other illegal activity. 
177 See Dadant letter, supra note 132. 
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1. Subject Matter Coverage 
The definitions sections of the two acts 178 should be revised to 
include elements of ASICs, such as cell libraries. The current 
requirement in the U.S. act that the mask be fixed on a chip l79 
should also be altered to cover designs capable of being fixed on 
chips, as well as those actually fixed. 180 Finally, provisions should 
be made for "personalization" layers, or the customer-defined 
connectors in a gate array.181 
2. Ownership 
Ownership is the second area in which the acts should be 
amended. The SCPA should be updated to reflect the prevalence 
of joint development in ASICs, and should allow for joint regis-
tration as does the Japanese Act. 182 Once joint registration is 
allowed, the acts should clearly define ownership during the var-
ious stages of ASIC design. 183 The ideal approach would be to 
canvass customers and vendors in the semiconductor industry in 
both nations to determine where lines should be drawn. It ap-
pears that today's customers are concerned about losing rights if 
they do not claim all their rights under the acts. 184 To avoid 
confusion, the acts should split ownership rights in joint devel-
opment situations. 185 The change should stipulate that each party 
retains ownership of circuit components it creates independently. 
Thus, the customer would retain rights to its interconnections, 
and any other modifications it makes to the vendor's base layers. 
The customer would also hold rights to the final, complete ASIC 
design. The vendor, however, would hold rights to the base layers 
themselves, as well as to the cell libraries. In each case, the party 
would receive protection for the fruits of its labors, but not more. 
17S Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U .S.C.A. § 901 (West Supp. 1991); Japanese 
Act, supra note 11, at art. 2. 
179 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 902 (West Supp. 1991). 
ISO In this way, the valuable cell libraries and other circuit elements owned by the 
semiconductor vendors could be protected before they are actually used in a customer-
driven design. 
lSI See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
IS2 Japanese Act, supra note 11, at art. 3(1). 
IS3 See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text. 
IS4 Kato Interview, supra note 12. 
IS5 See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text. Although there are instances where 
large semiconductor manufacturers do develop their own ASIC designs in-house, the 
bulk of ASIC design work is done through joint development projects. 
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In the event that the parties to the development want a different 
sort of arrangement, the amended acts should also allow them to 
contractually override these ownership provisions. 
3. Penalty Provisions 
Finally, legislators should make alterations in the penalty pro-
visions sections of the acts. Currently, the Japanese Act provides 
solely for criminal penalties, while the SCPA provides only for 
civil remedies. These differences reflect fundamental differences 
in each country's legal system. 186 Nevertheless, such disparate 
punishment for infringement could cause a corporation in one 
nation to hesitate to undertake development in the other. To 
remove this impediment, the penalty sections of each act should 
contain a provision that subjects an infringer in a foreign country 
to the penalties of its home country's law. In this way, each nation 
would be able to use its laws to deal with infringers, while holding 
its nationals operating overseas liable to the same penalties they 
would face for infringement at home. The beneficial result would 
be that a party operating overseas would always know what to 
expect if it infringed either country's law. 
CONCLUSION 
The SCPA and Japanese Act are two pieces of legislation that 
were appropriate at the time of their passage, but which have 
only limited utility in a changed marketplace. Contractual pro-
visions can provide some protection for the parties against each 
other, and should be used today. With the pace of technological 
change, however, it is wise to amend the acts to include clear 
provisions on ASICs that will also cover third parties. Unless the 
laws are revised to keep pace with technology, protection afforded 
semiconductors will be imprecise and confusing to vendors and 
customers, which could cause unnecessary delays in developments 
in this vital area of technology. 
Gerard V. Curtin, Jr. 
186 See VANWOLFEREN. supra note 107, at 212-18. Because of the fundamentally differ-
ent nature of the two legal systems. imposing the same penalties in both nations would 
be problematic. A criminal penalty is much more serious in Japan. where few disputes 
result in litigation. Similarly, the threat of civil litigation is more powerful in the United 
States, where access to courts is easier and the criminal system is heavily burdened. 
